måndag 13 juli 2015

DEN FRUKTLÖSA JAKTEN PÅ SKATTEN

Jakten på bolagsskatten går vidare. Både OECD och G20-länderna (BEPS-projektet) bedriver en intensiv verksamhet. EU-parlamentet röstade nyligen igenom ett förslag om att alla stora bolag ska vara tvungna att redovisa hur mycket skatt de betalar i varje land. I förslaget ingår också krav på att företagen ska redovisa vilka tillgångar de har och hur många anställda det finns i varje land. EU-parlamentet vill också att företagen ska vara tvungna att tydligt redovisa ägarförhållanden. Parlamentet vill att kraven ska gälla alla börsnoterade företag och även stora onoterade bolag. Vad definitionen av ett stort bolag kommer att bli återstår att se när ministerrådet och EU-kommissionen har behandlat frågan. Först då kommer det att bli en skarp lag som sedan implementeras i Sverige.




I Sverige hölls den 3 juni ett seminarium i Riksdagens skatteutskott om BEPS-projektets konsekvenser.


2015 års World Investment Report från FN-organet UNCTAD avlämnades nyligen. SvD rapporterade den 14 juli från presskonferensen, men artikeln berör endast den del av rapporten som handlar om bolagsskatteflykten.




Det hävdas i rapporten att  u-länderna går miste om bolagsskatter motsvarande 100 miljarder USD årligen genom att bolagen kanaliserar sina vinster via offshore-bolag. Bara Jungfruöarna ska ha tagit emot 60 - 90 miljarder dollar årligen. Det finns ju flera skatteoaser så totalbeloppet är säkerligen större, men det är å andra sidan inte bara beskattningsunderlag från u-länder som kanaliseras dit.




Nu är det här räkneexempel. Vad skulle hända om bolagen verkligen skulle betala skatterna? Skulle investeringarna då gjorts? Även länder som Nederländerna, Ungern och Luxemburg erbjuder förmånliga skattevillkor för utländska företag, påstås det. "Sådana upplägg gör att företagen undviker att betala skatt i utvecklingsländerna." Menar man att i-länder skulle höja sina skatter för att möjliggöra för u-länderna att dra in skatter?!




Å andra sidan ger Unctad en siffra på hur utländska investerare bidrar med skatteinkomster till utvecklingsländerna; 730 miljarder dollar årligen. Den siffran skulle kanske vara 100 miljarder lägre om bolagen inte slussade sina vinster till Jungfruöarna. Investeringarna skulle kanske gjorts någon annanstans. Kanske skulle kapitaltillflöde, sysselsättning och välstånd vara väsentligt högre om bolagens närvaro och aktivitet inte bestraffades med beskattning av de värden de skapar och de som verkligen bekostar bolagsskatterna - de anställda och konsumenterna i landet - betalar skatterna. Det är för dem som staten drar in skatter och det är de som har glädje av statens skatteinkomster. Bolagen kan göra sina investeringar annorstädes.
Viss tillnyktring kan skönjas i artikelns sista stycke, där Unctads biträdande generaldirektör, Joakim Reiter, säger: "Visst är det absolut nödvändigt att täppa igen hålen för att motverka skatteflykt. Men om det sker på ett sådant sätt att investeringsflödet samtidigt stryps är det knappast en hållbar lösning för u-länderna".


Att beskatta just vinsten är nog det dummaste de kan göra.


Avskaffa bolagsbeskattningen.








Här följer sammandraget av Unctad-rapportens skatteavsnitt:









INTERNATIONAL TAX AND INVESTMENT POLICY COHERENCE







Intense debate and concrete policy work is ongoing in the international community on the fiscal contribution
of MNEs. The focus is predominantly on tax avoidance – notably in the G20 project on base erosion and profit
shifting (BEPS). At the same time, sustained investment is needed in global economic growth and development,
especially in light of financing needs for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The policy imperative is to
take action against tax avoidance to support domestic resource mobilization and continue to facilitate productive
investment for sustainable development.
 
UNCTAD estimates the contribution of MNE foreign affiliates to government budgets in developing countries at
approximately $730 billion annually. This represents, on average, some 23 per cent of total corporate contributions and 10 per cent of total government revenues. The relative size (and composition) of this contribution varies by country and region. It is higher in developing countries than in developed countries, underlining the exposure and dependence of developing countries on corporate contributions. (On average, the government budgets of African countries depend on foreign corporate payments for 14 per cent of their funding.)
 
Furthermore, the lower a country is on the development ladder, the greater is its dependence on non-tax revenue
streams contributed by firms. In developing countries, foreign affiliates, on average, contribute more than
twice as much to government revenues through royalties on natural resources, tariffs, payroll taxes and social
contributions, and other types of taxes and levies, than through corporate income taxes.
 
MNEs build their corporate structures through cross-border investment. They do so in the most tax-efficient
manner possible, within the constraints of their business and operational needs. The size and direction of FDI
flows are thus often influenced by MNE tax considerations, because the structure and modality of investments
enable opportunities to avoid tax on subsequent investment income.
 
An investment perspective on tax avoidance puts the spotlight on the role of offshore investment hubs (tax
havens and special purpose entities in other countries) as major players in global investment. Some 30 per cent
of cross-border corporate investment stocks have been routed through offshore hubs before reaching their
destination as productive assets. (UNCTAD’s FDI database removes the associated double-counting effect.)
 
The outsized role of offshore hubs in global corporate investments is largely due to tax planning, although other
factors can play a supporting role. MNEs employ a range of tax avoidance levers, enabled by tax rate differentials
between jurisdictions, legislative mismatches, and tax treaties. MNE tax planning involves complex multilayered
corporate structures. Two archetypal categories stand out: (i) intangibles-based transfer pricing schemes and (ii)
financing schemes. Both schemes, which are representative of a relevant part of tax avoidance practices, make
use of investment structures involving entities in offshore investment hubs – financing schemes especially rely on
direct investment links through hubs.
 
Tax avoidance practices by MNEs are a global issue relevant to all countries: the exposure to investments from
offshore hubs is broadly similar for developing and developed countries. However, profit shifting out of developing
countries can have a significant negative impact on their prospects for sustainable development. Developing
countries are often less equipped to deal with highly complex tax avoidance practices because of resource
constraints or lack of technical expertise.
 
Tax avoidance practices are responsible for a significant leakage of development financing resources. An
estimated $100 billion of annual tax revenue losses for developing countries is related to inward investment
stocks directly linked to offshore hubs. There is a clear relationship between the share of offshore-hub investment
in host countries’ inward FDI stock and the reported (taxable) rate of return on FDI. The more investment is
routed through offshore hubs, the less taxable profits accrue. On average, across developing economies,
every 10 percentage points of offshore investment is associated with a 1 percentage point lower rate of return.
These averages disguise country-specific impacts.
Tax avoidance practices by MNEs lead to a substantial loss of government revenue in developing countries.
The basic issues of fairness in the distribution of tax revenues between jurisdictions that this implies must be
addressed. At a particular disadvantage are countries with limited tax collection capabilities, greater reliance on
tax revenues from corporate investors, and growing exposure to offshore investments.
 
Therefore, action must be taken to tackle tax avoidance, carefully considering the effects on international
investment. Currently, offshore investment hubs play a systemic role in international investment flows: they
are part of the global FDI financing infrastructure. Any measures at the international level that might affect the
investment facilitation function of these hubs, or key investment facilitation levers (such as tax treaties), must
include an investment policy perspective.
 
Ongoing anti-avoidance discussions in the international community pay limited attention to investment policy.
The role of investment in building the corporate structures that enable tax avoidance is fundamental. Therefore,
investment policy should form an integral part of any solution to tax avoidance.
 
A set of guidelines for coherent international tax and investment policies may help realize the synergies between
investment policy and initiatives to counter tax avoidance. Key objectives include removing aggressive tax
planning opportunities as investment promotion levers; considering the potential impact on investment of antiavoidance measures; taking a partnership approach in recognition of shared responsibilities between host,
home and conduit countries; managing the interaction between international investment and tax agreements;
and strengthening the role of both investment and fiscal revenues in sustainable development as well as the
capabilities of developing countries to address tax avoidance issues.
 
 
 
WIR14 showed the massive worldwide financing needs for sustainable development and the important role that
FDI can play in bridging the investment gap, especially in developing countries. In this light, strengthening the
global investment policy environment, including both the IIA and the international tax regimes, must be a priority.
The two regimes, each made up of a “spaghetti bowl” of over 3,000 bilateral agreements, are interrelated, and
they face similar challenges. And both are the object of reform efforts. Even though each regime has its own
specific reform priorities, there is merit in considering a joint agenda. This could aim for more inclusiveness, better
governance and greater coherence to manage the interaction between international tax and investment policies,
not only avoiding conflict between the regimes but also making them mutually supportive. The international
investment and development community should, and can, eventually build a common framework for global
investment cooperation for the benefit of all.













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